THE FTC'S ANNUAL LINE-OF-BUSINESS
REPORTING PROGRAM
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently implemented a Line-of-Business (LB) reporting program" in an effort to
provide more meaningful financial information on industry in the
United States. Under the program, large conglomerate corporations
engaged in several lines of business are being required to provide
the FTC with detailed financial information on their activities according to particular product lines. After obtaining the data, the FTC

plans to publish statistical reports on, aggregate profits, costs, and
other financial data for each specific line of business. As might be
expected, the program has been the subject of much recent debate
over the need for the information2 as balanced against the burdens
imposed on private industry by the reporting requirements.'

As a preliminary matter, this Note will outline the present status
of the LB program, its background, and the need for such a pro-

gram.

The legality of the program will then be assessed through

an examination of the scope of the Commission's authority to conduct general economic and financial investigations. This analysis
will be focused upon two broad and independent inquiries: (1)
whether the FTC has the authority -to compel corporations to respond

to LB reports and, if so, what the limitations are on the exercise of
that authority, and (2) whether the FTC should be restrained from
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Bureau of Economics Staff Report, Federal Trade Commission Line of Business Reporting Program [hereinafter cited as Bureau Staff Report];
Report to the Comptroller General of the United States on the Evaluation of the
Federal Trade Commission's Proposed Annual Line of Business Report (Form LB)
[hereinafter cited as Report to the Comptroller General].
Copies of all sources cited in this Note are on file at the offices of Duke Law Tournal, Durham, North Carolina.
1. The LB reporting forms for the first year of the program were mailed in August,
1974, and they request information for fiscal years ending between July 1, 1973, and
June 30, 1974. FTC Line of Business Program Questions and Answers, No. LB-2.
2. Proponents argue that the program is needed to provide the product-line data
that is rapidly becoming unavailable due to the growth of multiproduct corporations in
American industry. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Peter Rodino and Senator
Philip Hart to Senator John McClellan and Representative George Mahon, May 9, 1974,
reprintedin 663 BNA ANTrnUsT & TkADE REG. REP. H-1 (May 14, 1974).
3. See, e.g., Letter from Richard D. Godown, General Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, to Phillip S. Hughes, Assistant Comptroller General, April
15, 1974, at 1-2.
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publishing the aggregate LB reports as currently planned because

of a possibility of disclosure of confidential individual company statistics.
OUTLINE OF THE LINE-oF-BusINEss PROGRAM
Under the current version of the LB program,4 many

of the
largest United States corporations' are being required annually to
provide the FTC with financial information on their activities in over

two hundred industrial categories, or lines of business." The information to be provided includes statistics on sales, expenses (including
costs for advertising and research and development), and values of

assets (including plant, property, and equipment) used in each product
line. 7

These particular statistics are, in the Commission's view,

important indicators of the competitive performance of American industry. After acquisition of this information, the FTC staff will aggregate the data from all reporting corporations and publish statistics
for each industrial category. 9 The FTC plans to keep the data for
individual companies confidential,"0 and the information for any par-

4. The present version represents the third revision of the program since August,
1973. It has been revised in response to numerous comments and criticisms from interested parties including business firms, consumer groups, and congressmen. Report to the
Comptroller General 2. An earlier LB proposal was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for approval in the fall of 1970 but was rejected. 119 CoNG. Rnc. S
13,442 (daily ed. July 14, 1973) (remarks of Senator Hart).
5. A total of 345 corporations are currently participating in the program. 667
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-3 (June 11, 1974).
6. There are a total of 228 line-of-business categories, 219 of which are in manufacturing. Bureau Staff Report 15. Unless a company keeps its own records according
to lines of business, it will be allowed to report the information by plant or other economic unit. FTC Form LB, Annual Line of Business Report, item D, at 7. This means
that the statistics for each plafit or other economic unit will be reported according to
its primary line-of-business category, regardless of the fact that some operations in the
establishment may be in other lines of business. Id. Any line of business which has
less than ten million dollars in sales will be reported in a miscellaneous category. Questions and Answers, supranote 1, No. LB-4.
7. See FTC Form LB, supra note 6, item E, at 10-14.
8. See Bureau of Economics Staff, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Form LB Supporting Statement, at 1.
9. The published report for each line-of-business category will resemble a fairly
complete income statement and an abbreviated balance sheet. Bureau Staff Report 22.
Other components of the report will include -tables showing rates of return on assets and
profit margins on sales, and an analysis published in the form of a matrix showing the
extent of secondary product contamination in the statistics. Id. at 24. Secondary product contamination occurs when financial data are reported in a line of business different
from their proper category. This can happen, for example, when some operations in
an establishment are in a category other than the primary classification of the establishment. See note 6 supra.
10. FTC Resolution Requiring Annual Line of Business Reports from Corporations,
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ticular reporting cell will not be published unless data from at least
four firms has been submitted and aggregated for that particular
1
cell.'
The current LB questionnaire, revised in response to suggestions
arising out of administrative hearings, 2 was submitted to the General
Accounting Office for review and clearance pursuant to the recently
amended Federal Reports Act. 3 The FTC had to defer gathering
information 14 until the Comptroller General specifically found that
the method proposed to collect the information would impose the minimum burden on businesses and that the data was not presently available from another source within the government.' 5 The Acting Comptroller General approved the questionnaire, but limited his approval to
the first year, with future approval conditioned upon the FTC's increasing the reliability of the information collected and published.' 6
August 2, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,377 (1974); Rules and Procedures for the Use of Confidential Individual Company Data Collected Under the FTC's Line of Business Report
Program, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,970 (1974).
11. See Letter from Charles Tobin, Secretary of the FTC, to Ira M. Millstein and
Mark A. Jacoby, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Sept. 24, 1974, at 5 (FTC response to motion
to quash).
12. Report to the Comptroller General 2.
13. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512 (Supp. 1974), amending 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970). At the
time the LB program was initially proposed, the Federal Reports Act required the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to review all federal agency information-collection
programs to determine whether or not -the program was necessary for the proper functioning of the agency. 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970), as amended, 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512
(Supp. 1974). During the pendency of the OMB review of the proposal, the Act was
amended to substitute the General Accounting Office (GAO) as the reviewing agency.
The principal reason for the amendment was apparently that the OMB, as part of the
executive branch, should not have a veto power over the programs of independent regulatory agencies. 119 CoNG. REc. S13,442 (daily ed. July 14, 1973) (remarks of Senator Hart). But a very significant congressional motive was to allow the FTC to implement the LB program without interference from the OMB, which had blocked an earlier
LB proposal in 1971. See id.
14. However, "the independent regulatory agency shall make the final determination
as to the necessity of the information in carrying out its statutory responsibilities and
whether to collect such information." 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512(d) (Supp. 1974).
15. Id. § 3512(a).
16. Letter from R.F. Keller, Acting Comptroller General, to Lewis Engman, Chairman of the FTC, May 13, 1974.
The program was found consistent with the Federal Reports Act, subject to three
provisos. First, approval was "limited to the initial round of reports," with approval of
future rounds "subject to significant reductions in or elimination of the problems which
make the initial data unreliable. . . ." Id. Second, the FTC was directed to conduct
"intensive discussions with business representatives" aimed at increasing accuracy and
reducing the compliance burden. Id. Third, the FTC was to explore "with other federal agencies . . . the possibility of coordinating or consolidating its LB data needs with
data collected by those agencies." Id. The GAO apparently took the position that reliability of results was a factor in the determination of minimum burden. See Report to
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Following the initial mailing of the LB questionnaires, the business community immediately registered its opposition to the program
by filing numerous motions with the FTC to quash the Commission's
order to file the LB reports.1 7

The Commission overruled these mo-

tions but granted additional time to file new motions limited to the
issues of maintaining the confidentiality of individual company data
and the burden of compliance, directing that the claims be factually

substantiated.:'

Several companies did file second motions 9 which

challenged the LB orders on the grounds of unreasonable burden,2 0

but more importantly they introduced evidence that sophisticated
mathematical pattern-recognition techniques could be used to disaggregate the published LB report so that confidential individual company statistics could be discovered. 2 '

In spite of those claims, the

Commission again overruled the motion. 22 Although the first LB reports were due from participating corporations during January, 1975,23
the Comptroller General 13.
The FTC responded to this limited approval by denying that the Federal Reports
Act gave the Comptroller General the authority to condition continuation of the program. See Letter from Lewis Engman, Chairman of the FTC, to Senator Philip Hart,
May 15, 1974, at 2. In the Commission's view, "GAO comments under the statute
should be restricted to questions of duplication and burden and should not be addressed
to other issues such as reliability of data." Id. Since the Commission had determined
that the program would generate information "sufficiently reliable to warrant its collection," it considered the matter closed. Letter from Charles Tobin, supra note 11, at 1.
Mr. Tobin wrote: "Comments of the Comptroller General concerning the unreliability
of information to be collected are not binding on the Commission, because the decision
as to the necessity and usefulness of such data is committed by law -to the Commission
. ."

Id.

17. At least 193 motions to quash were filed. 696 BNA ANTTRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-13 (Ian. 14, 1975). The grounds for these motions to quash included claims
that the Commission had exceeded its statutory authority in implementing the LB program because the data collected would be unreliable and the order to file LB reports
was excessively burdensome, and that the order to file LB reports was unlawful because
it failed to protect against the disclosure of individual company data. See Motion to
Quash Order to File Special Report and to Grant Ancillary Relief, In re Aluminum Co.
of America (F.T.C., filed Aug. 20, 1974).
18. Letter from Charles Tobin, supra note 11, at 1, 5.
19. See Motion to Quash Order to File Special Report as Modified and to Grant
Ancillary Relief at 3, In re Aluminum Co. of America (F.T.C., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. See generally Memorandum on Disaggregation of Line-of-Business Data from
R. Christensen & T. Reichert to Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Oct. 26, 1974.
22. 696 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-13 (Jan. 14, 1975). The Commission found that the disaggregation hypotheticals put forward by the moving parties were
improbable, and in any case, the program had been structured to minimize the dangers
of disclosure of individual data. As for the issue of the burden of preparation, the Commission maintained the position that the data could be gathered inexpensively by complying corporations, and hence the order was not unduly burdensome. Id.
23. Id.
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many reports were not submitted because actions had been brought
in two federal courts to enjoin enforcement of the LB orders, and it
now appears that final implementation of the program may be de-

layed considerably.24

According to the FTC, the LB program is necessary because cur-

rent reporting programs and other currently available sources of financial information on American industry have proven inadequate 25
to enable the FTC to fulfill its statutory responsibilities of investigating the extent of competition in the United States economy and reporting these results to the government and the public. 26 In the Com-

mission's view, this kind of systematic, comprehensive reporting on
the financial status of narrowly defined industrial categories will

generally improve economic performance in American industry by
disclosing the performance of individual industries.
The FTC
suggests that the LB information will help to improve the function-

ing of capital markets by exposing the rate of return on capital in
particular industries.28

It will also aid the federal government in

its development of an overall national economic policy.2 9 Further24. Actions were brought by companies challenging the program in federal district
courts in Delaware and New York. In the New York suit, the court has recently denied
a petition for preliminary injunctive relief on the ground that there had been no showing
of irreparable injury or hardship to warrant such relief. Aluminum Co. of America v.
FTC, 700 BNA Aemmusr & TRmF, REG. REP. A-6 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 5, 1975). In the
Delaware suit, however, the court granted preliminary injunctive relief to seven companies on 'the ground that the program violates rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 702
BNA ANTTrrusT & Tnsnn REG. REP. A-1 (D. Del., Feb. 19, 1975). Meanwhile, the
FTC has petitioned for enforcement of its orders against thirty-four companies under
section nine of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970). FrC v. American Standard, Inc.,
702 BNA ANTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-1 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 20, 1975). As of February 25, 1975, 197 of the 345 participating companies had filed LB reports with the
Commission. Id.
25. Such programs as the FTC's long-standing Quarterly Financial Report Series
(QFR) and the Securities & Exchange Commission's 10-K reports have been found inadequate by the FrC. See Bureau of Economics Staff, supra note 8, at 6; Address by
Calvin Collier, General Counsel of -the FTC, before the Association of General Counsel,
May 10, 1974, at 2. Similarly, individual company annual shareholder reports are not
adequate sources of LB data, although the New York Stock Exchange has adopted a recommendation of the Financial Executives Institute that product line reporting be included in annual financial reports. See Report to the Comptroller General 4-5.
26. Bureau of Economics Staff, supra note 8, at 1.
27. Bureau Staff Report 7.
28. Statement of Frederic Schierer, staff member of the FTC, before the Fifth Annual National Conference of the National Investor Relations Institute, Oct. 21, 1974;
see Bureau Staff Report 7.
29. See Letter from Representative Peter Rodino and Senator Philip Hart, supra
note 2. Congress and the President will obviously be much better equipped to deal with
the nation's economic problems if this sort of detailed information on American industry
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more, although no individual company's data will be disclosed to
the FTC enforcement staff, 30 the aggregate reports will aid the FTC

in its antitrust enforcement policy planning by pinpointing areas of
possible anticompetitive activity.81
LEGALITY OF THE FTC's LINE-OF-BUSINESS PROGRAM

Authority to Require LB Reports from Corporations
The FTC's power to compel corporations to file reports containing line-of-business data is based upon the broad investigatory authority granted in the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),32 which
authorizes the Commission to conduct investigations concerning the
"organization, business, conduct, practices and management of any
corporation engaged in commerce," 3 3 and in particular, "to require,
by general or special orders, corporations engaged in commerce . . .
to file with the Commission in such form as the Commission may prereports or answers in writing to specific
scribe annual or special ..
,.
questions . .

Since its inception the FTC has successfully implemented many
economic and financial reporting schemes.3 5 While previous FTC
attempts to implement a comparative reporting program for large
conglomerate corporations have been blocked, 30 including an earlier
is available. Congress' recent experience in trying to obtain meaningful data on the petroleum industry in connection with its development of energy policy provides an illustration of this point. Id.
30. See Rules and Procedures for the Use of Confidential Individual Company
Data, supra note 10.
31. Bureau of Economics Staff, supra note 8, at 2. Because of the Commission's
limited resources, the problem of enforcement priorities has for many years been an extremely troublesome issue. Maelntyre & Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission, 11
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 723, 733 (1970).
32. Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(1)-(2) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 46(a)-(b) (1970), reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. 25,257.
33. Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(1) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(a) (1970), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. 25,257.
34. Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(2) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(b) (1970), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. 1 25,257. The APA forbids agencies
from requiring reports and demanding information "except as authorized by law." 5
U.S.C. § 555(c) (1970). If the FTC has the authority to require reports under section
6(b) of the FTCA, then the APA provision is satisfied. See United States v.'Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644-47 (1950). Refusal to respond to an FTC order to file
a report subjects the corporation to a $100 per day penalty for every day of delinquency.
Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 203(c)(1), (2) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 50
(1970), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. 1 25,257.
35. See generally Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade Commission:
50 Years' Experience, 24 FED. BAR J. 489, 496-502 (1964).
36. In 1962, the Commission decided to undertake an investigation of some of the
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version of the LB program,3 7 the recent attempts to implement the cur-

rent LB program have been more successful, in part because of
the recent change in the Federal Reports Act. 8
Despite the extensive history of comprehensive economic and financial reporting programs, the Commission's use of the reports authority in this area has seldom been challenged in the courts. 39
As a consequence, the judicial guidelines on the exercise of the re-

ports authority have generally arisen from cases concerned with more
specific reports ordered by the FTC in its enforcement activities.

Con-

sistent with the apparent congressional intent to give the FTC broad
reports authority,4 0 the courts have interpreted that power expanlargest United States manufacturing corporations, seeking information on company products, merger activity, and relationships to other corporations. This program generated
substantial controversy, and in the FTC's 1964 appropriation bill, Congress included a
provision that no funds were to be used for an economic questionnaire or financial study
of intercorporate relations. Pub. L. No. 88-507, 78 Stat. 640 (Aug. 30, 1964); see
Boyle, supra note 35, at 501.
37. In 1971, an earlier LB proposal was rejected by the OMB which at that time
was authorized by the Federal Reports Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970), as amended, 44
U.S.C.A. § 3512 (Supp. 1974), to review FTC information-collection programs. 119
CoNG. REc. S13,442 (daily ed. July 14, 1973) (remarks of Senator Hart).
38. See 44 U.S.C.A. § 3512 (Supp. 1974), amending 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (1970). See
note 13 supra. A current but unenacted appropriations bill for the FTC would finance
the FTC's LB costs for gathering information from 500 corporations. See 120 CoNG.
REc. H10,223 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974); id. at S20,053 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1974).
39. The cases in which the use of the reports authority has been challenged in general economic and financial investigations are dated and not very useful. See, e.g., FTC
v. Millers' National Fed'n, 47 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (an investigation of costs,
prices, and profits in the flour and bread industry; the court holding that the Commission's authority to order production of the information could not be determined in a suit
brought to enjoin the FTC order); FTC v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1927) (investigation of coal and steel industries to acquire financial information; the
court holding that an action to enjoin FTC enforcement of the order did not lie because
of an adequate remedy at law); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936 (D.C. Cir.
1923), rev'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927) (investigation to acquire information on coke and coal industries; the lower court enjoining the FTC orders on the ground
that the FTC lacked the authority to seek information on intrastate commerce; the Supreme Court reversing on procedural grounds).
40. The powers granted by 15 U.S.C. H6 46(a)-(b) (1970), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(1)-(2) (Jan. 4, 1975), reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP.
If 25, 257, see notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text, were founded upon the investigative and publicity powers of the FTC's predecessor, the Bureau of Corporations. The
Bureau of Corporations was part of the executive branch and engaged almost exclusively
in economic investigations and reports. MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 31, at 725.
Congress considered these investigative and publicity powers of primary importance in
promoting "an elevated business standard and a better business stability," and in providing a check on "the growth of monopoly." H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4
(1914). As one commentator has concluded:
iThere seems to have been little doubt of what the reporting powers given

396
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sively, with minimal limitations. Thus, in the leading case of United
States v. Morton Salt Co.,41 where the FTC ordered the corporation

to file special reports to monitor compliance with the agency's cease
and desist order, the Supreme Court sustained the report requirement,
indicating that the reports provision could be used in the further-

ance of any FTC statutory duty.42 Furthermore, the court recognized that a reasonable demand for reports43-- one within the authority of the agency, seeking relevant information, and not too broad or
unreasonably burdensome 44-- even if initiated to satisfy "nothing more
than agency curiosity," 45 would not violate the fourth amendment pro-

scriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures or the fifth
amendment due process clause.
Cases subsequent to Morton Salt have likewise interpreted the

FTC reports authority broadly, 46 and the prevalent judicial attitude
toward administrative demands for information has been one of def-

erence to the agency. Once the court is satisfied that the agency has the
authority to demand the information, the criteria of relevancy and

lack of unreasonable burden are easily met. Typically, agency orders
have been considered presumptively relevant-no affirmative demonstration of relevance by the agency is required. 47 Similarly, courts
to the Commission were supposed to accomplish. The Commission was to
have all necessary powers to enable it to determine the facts with respect to
certain industries and practices, and, having ascertained the facts, to make
Boyle, supra note 35,
them known to Congress and the general public....
at 491.
41. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
42. Id. at 649. "[I]t would appear to grant ample power to order the reports here
in question. Respondents are in the class subject to inquiry . . . and the matter to be
reported would seem to be as to business conduct and practices about which the Commission is authorized to inquire." Id.
43. In Morton Salt, the Court emphasized and redefined the test it had earlier established in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), where the
Court had stated: 'The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms,
that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable." Id. at 208.
44. 338 U.S. at 652.
45. Id.
46. In the leading case of St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208
(1961), the Court sustained a Commission order requiring the corporation -to file special
reports for the purpose of uncovering possible antitrust violations prior to the issuance
of a complaint. In United States v. Litton Indus., Inc., 462 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972),
the Ninth Circuit held that the FTC could require a corporation to file a report relating
to a general investigation of conglomerate corporation mergers and at the same time
maintain a separate divestiture action against the same corporation under the antitrust
laws. See also Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971) (discussed
in note 48 infra).
47. See CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957), where the Supreme Court reversed
per curiam a lower court holding that the relevance of each item sought by the Civil
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have been reluctant to quash administrative demands for information on the ground that they are too burdensome, particularly if
the information sought is relevant to the inquiry."
However, one
court has stated that "it must . . . appear that there is some reason-

able proportion between the public value of the information likely to
be obtained and the private annoyance and irritation it will occasion. ' ' 9
The LB program as presently constituted arguably satisfies each
of the judicially imposed requirements of authority, relevancy, and
lack of unreasonable burden. First, such a program seems to be
expressly authorized by the FTCA, which empowers the FTC to conduct general investigations into business structure, conduct, and man-

agement, as well as to require corporations to respond to Commission
inquiries with periodic reports or answers."
Further, since the purpose of the LB program is to provide the government with particularized statistics on prescribed lines of business, the FTC request for in-

formation is by definition relevant.

1

The prohibition of unreasonable

Aeronautics Board in its investigation must be established before the order would be enforced.
48. See Withrow, Investigatory Powers of the Federal Trade Commission-Constitutional and Statutory Limitations, 24 FED. B.J. 456, 481 (1964). The question of unreasonably burdensome compliance is almost invariably tied to the question of relevancy,
and the mere fact that an order is extremely broad or burdensome is not very persuasive
if all the information sought is in fact relevant to the inquiry. Id. In Genuine Parts
Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971), the FTC had ordered the corporation to
file a special report to determine if the corporation had violated the antitrust laws in
making certain corporate acquisitions. The court responded to the corporation's contentions that the FTC order was too broad and compliance would be unreasonably burdensome by noting first that the information sought went "to the very heart of the inquiry,"
id. at 1391, and then concluding that the order was not burdensome when "considered
in light of the pertinent responses" it would produce, id.
49. FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 F. 886, 889-90 (D. Md. 1922), affd, 267 U.S.
586 (1925); cf. FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). InCohn, the court
stated: "There is a delicate balance between the necessity of obtaining information required in the public interest in furtherance of a lawful inquiry, and the onerous burdens
which the furnishing of this information may place on these respondents." Id. at 908.
50. Pub. L. No. 93-637, §§ 201(b), 203(a)(1)-(2) (Jan. 4, 1975), amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 46(a)-(b) (1970), reprinted in 4 TRAoE REG. REP.
25,257. See notes
32-34 supra and accompanying text. The program is but another in a long line of FTC
general and economic reporting programs that have been implemented through -the use
of the reports authority. See generally Boyle, supra note 35, at 496-502. The legislative
history of the reports provision clearly indicates that this was the type of program that
Congress had in mind when it gave the Commission this authority, see note 40 supra;
in any case, the courts have construed the provision broadly, even beyond the confines of general economic and financial reporting programs. See, e.g., St. Regis Paper
Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S:
632 (1950). See notes 41-49 supra and accompanying text.
51. As was noted earlier, the mere FTC request for the information will create a
presumption of relevancy. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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It has been suggested

that an agency's demand for information is unreasonably burdensome when the private cost of generating that information outweighs
the public benefit of obtaining it.52 While it is difficult to measure
these quantities precisely, at least a gross approximation must be
made if reasonableness is to be determined. If the information
gathered in the LB program is to be usefully compared and aggregated by the public and the government, it must be reported accord-

ing to uniform classifications. As currently constructed, however, the
information to be produced will suffer from nonuniformities and distortions. 53 Essentially, the problem is one of applying uniform accounting standards to the data. Subjective classifications of the com-

mon costs of producing items which fall within more than one LB category,54 nonuniform allocation of intra-company transfer expenses, 55
and the FTC's adoption of the establishment basis of reporting 0 all
tend to decrease the reliability of the LB information.s1

Notwithstanding the less than perfect reliability of the aggregate
data, the information produced from the LB program will be a sub52. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
53. The Assistant Comptroller General has found that the data produced under the
program will be "unreliable at best, and may be seriously misleading." Report to the
Comptroller General 15.
54. The FTC's proposal for dealing with common costs is: (1) it will accept
allocations of common costs already made by reporting companies and apparently intends to aggregate the resulting data although widely different allocation methods may have been used by different companies; and (2) for common
costs not allocated by the reporting companies, the FTC will apply its own unspecified allocation formulas. Id. at 8.
Hence, the costs included in each LB category will be the result of a unilateral determination by either the reporting companies or the FTC, with consequent sacrifice of accuracy.
55. If a company is vertically integrated so that the output of one segment of its
operation within one line-of-business category is forwarded to another segment of its operation in another FTC category for further processing, some arbitrary computations
must be performed in order to determine the proper "sales" and "costs" to be reported
in each category. Although methods of computing transfer costs vary widely among
companies, see id. at 9, the FTC plans to accept the methods used by the companies
and to aggregate the resulting figures, see id. Obviously, this process can introduce substantial inaccuracy into the aggregated data.
56. The establishment basis of reporting allows companies to report the data for a
single plant in the category of the "primary activity" of that plant. See FTC Form LB,
supra note 6, item D, at 7. As a consequence of the establishment basis, data appropriately reported in other categories is reported in the primary category.
57. As the Assistant Comptroller General has assessed the overall situation,
the aggregated profit figure for each FTC category will be the end product of
subjective judgment by each company in allocating costs common to two or
more FTC categories and in computing transfer costs, and an arbitrary allocation of all the sales, costs, and profits of a multicategory establishment to the
category to which the primary activity of the establishment is assigned. Report to the Comptroller General 6,
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stantial improvement over any currently available statistics." s

Fur-

thermore, the Commission has determined, and its determinations

have traditionally been given deference, 59 that the public value of the
information to be obtained does in fact justify the expense of compli-

ance. 60 Finally, the inaccuracies of the LB program are attributable
in large part to the FTC's efforts to reduce the compliance burden on
the reporting entities by accepting some of the accounting information
in the form it is now being gathered by individual companies rather
than requiring them to keep an additional set of books for purposes

of FTC reporting requirements."

Although the estimates of the costs

of compliance vary dramatically, 6 2 even the highest estimates seem

less significant when compared to the profits of the reporting companies, which are among the largest corporations in the United
States.
May the FTC Publish the Aggregate LB Reports?
The FTCA gives the Commission the discretionary authority to

publish the information it gathers under its reports authority, except
that "trade secrets and names of customers" are specifically excepted

from public disclosure.63 In addition to the "trade secrets" prohibition, -the Commission may be restrained from the publication of other

business secrets under the general limitation on the disclosure of confidential information.

The propriety of the proposed public disclosure

58. See Letter from Lewis Engman, supra note 16, at 2. See notes 25-30 supra and
accompanying text.
59. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
60. The Commission rejected the argument that the burden of compliance was unreasonable in denying the companies' motion to quash the FTC orders to file special
reports. See Statement of Federal Trade Commission, Jan. 9, 1975, on Rejection of Renewed Motions to Quash its Line of Business Reporting Program, reprintedin 696 BNA
ANrrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. F-i et seq. (Jan. 14, 1975).
61. See Bureau Staff Report 20-21; Letter from Lewis Engman, supra note 16, at
3.
62. The FTC currently stimates the costs will be $10,000 to $20,000 per corporation for the first year, and $5,000 to $10,000 per year for succeeding years. On the
other hand, some companies estimate that it will cost them from $350,000 to $1,800,000
for the initial year, and $95,000 to $325,000 per year for succeeding years. Report to
the Comptroller General 10.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970), which in pertinent part provides that the Commission shall have the power "[tlo make public from time to time such . . . information obtained by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall
Section 10 of the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §
deem expedient in the public interest .......
50 (1970), contains an additional restraint on the public disclosure of confidential information: "Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public any information obtained by the Commission without its authority, unless directed by a court,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
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by the FTC of aggregated LB data must be examined in light of these

two limitations.
Arguably, the trade secrets exception is broad enough to encom-

pass all financial data of competitive significance, 4 such as that being reported by individual companies in the LB reports. While there
is apparently no judicial definition of trade secrets in the context of
the reports authority of the FTCA, the term "trade secrets" in other
situations has been interpreted to include this kind of otherwise con-

fidential business information. 5 Furthermore, under substantive
trade secret law, nontechnological internal business organization information and information on the methods of operation, such as will
be gathered in the LB program, can be characterized as trade se-

crets. 10

However, in the context of agency adjudications, the FTC

has been inconsistent in its treatment of confidential business infor-

mation. In H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,"7 the FTC established a dichotomous approach to the protection of confidential information. Business records such as cost and profit data were held to be entitled to a
lesser degree of protection than traditional trade secrets such as secret formulae and research processes.

Business records would be pro-

tected from public disclosure only "in exceptional circumstances upon
a clear showing that an irreparable injury will result," ' s while a presumption of the requisite degree of injury would arise when any dis64. The legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970) tends to support this proposition. See 51 CoNG. REc. 12,744-45 (1914) (remarks of Senator Weeks). Senator
Weeks, an opponent of the trade commission bill, expressed concern over the possible
public disclosure of "the essential facts connected with the organization, stockholders,
financial condition, and general business conduct" of corporations required to disclose
this information to the FrC, id. at 12,744, further noting that this kind of information
takes "on elements of a trade-mark," id. at 12,745. In response to this sort of criticism,
the provision in the original bill preventing disclosure of "trade processes," see 51 CONG.
Ruc. 10,377 (1914), was changed to "trade secrets," see 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1970).
65. In connection with the protection of trade secrets in litigation, Professor Wigmore noted that trade secrets include not only "chemical and physical composition of
substances employed, and. . . the mechanical structure of tools and machines, but also
. . . such other facts of a possibly private nature as the names of customers, the subjects
and amounts of expense, and the like." 8 J. WioMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2212, at 155 (MeNaughton ed. 1961). In FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court
responded to an FCC petition for enforcement of an order seeking information on profits, production costs, and sales prices by granting enforcement of -the order but imposing
restrictions on the agency's voluntary disclosure of the data, noting that it was "in the
nature of a trade secret, the disclosure of which might well do great if not irreparable
harm to the. . . business." Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
66. See Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HAnv. L. REv. 1432, 1437 (1967).
67. 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961).
68. Id. at 1189. However, the "irreparable injury" -test was found to be too harsh
in Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D.D.C. 1963).
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closure of a traditional trade secret was threatened.

9

While -this

decision has been incorporated by reference into the Commission's
Rules of Practice for the disclosure of confidential information in

agency adjudications, 70 recent FTC decisions have apparently abandoned the dichotomous treatment.

In Lehigh Portland Cement,71 the

Commission adopted the position that trade secrets as well as confidential business information would be protected if disclosure would

result in "clearly defined serious injury" to the person or corporation
whose records were involved.7 2 Furthermore, where the confidential

business information involved is current, a presumption of serious injury is generally established, and disclosure of trade secrets and confi73
dential business information is restrained.
Even if the trade secrets exception to the discretionary publication provision is not broad enough to encompass competitively significant financial information, the FTC may still be restrained from
disclosing confidential cost and profit data under general limitations

on the disclosure of confidential information. In connection with the
protection of business secrets in litigation, "courts long have given

protection to various types of confidential business information on the
principle that intentionally inflicted harm is actionable unless privileged."' 74 Moreover, courts have commonly imposed limitations on
the disclosure of confidential business information in enforcing administrative orders and subpoenas.7,5 For example, in FTC v. Men-

zies,70 the court enforced an FTC subpoena issued in connection
with price discrimination proceedings but imposed restrictions on the
69. 58 F.T.C. at 1189. For a more complete discussion of Hood, see Gellhorn, The
Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PA. L.Rnv. 401, 416-19 (1968).
70. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.45(b) (1974).
71. 74 F.T.C. 1585 (1968).
72. Id. at 1588.
73. Gellhorn, supra note 69, at 419. However, the definition of "current" has not
been uniform. In Crown Cork & Seal Co., 71 F.T.C. 1714 (1967), the Commission
refused to grant confidential status to a non-party witness' business records which were
from two and one-half to six and one-half years old. The Commission stated: "More
recent or current records may require different treatment. As to these, although injury
may not be demonstrated, it might be more readily inferred since injury flowing from
their disclosure would be more immediate and palpable." Id. at 1715. In National Tea
Co., 69 F.T.C. 226 (1966), the FTC let stand a trial examiner's order that sales figures
which were seven years old be accorded confidential status. See id. at 272.
74. Gellhorn, supra note 69, at 408 (footnote omitted).
75. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade
Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 113, 125-26 (1968).
76. 145 F. Supp. 164 (D.Md. 1956), affd, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 957 (1957).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1975:389

disclosure of the secret business documents involved, stating that
"[n]o part of the documentary evidence should be made public and
available to the competitors of the several respondent corporations
unless it is necessary to do so in the proper enforcement of the law."77
Recently, parties submitting confidential business information to the
government have been permitted to utilize the exemption in the Freedom of Information Act for confidential commercial information to
prevent an agency from voluntarily releasing the confidential information7 8
Although there are few decisions on the question, the protection
accorded confidential business information in judicial proceedings has
been extended to restrain the public disclosure of information submitted to agencies in general economic and financial investigations.
An important case in this area is FCC v. Cohn.79 While in an earlier
case the same court had allowed the FTC to compel a company to
disclose confidential business information to the agency in a general
economic investigation without requiring FTC assurances that the information would remain confidential, 0 the Cohn decision adopted a
different position. Cohn involved an FCC investigation of the structure, operation, and extent of competition in the broadcasting industry. In the course of the investigation, the FCC mailed questionnaires to motion picture and television producers seeking detailed financial information including profits, production costs, and sales
prices. When the producers refused to respond to the questionnaires,
the FCC brought an action for enforcement. The court enforced the
request for information, but enjoined the Commission from publicly
disclosing the financial data, noting that disclosure "would not only
harm the respondents [producers] but give their competitors unfair
advantage." 81
The argument has been made by the opponents of the LB program that the FTC should be prohibited from publishing the aggregate LB reports because the publication of these reports in the FTC's
proposed format will result in the disclosure of individual company
77. Id. at 171. See also FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (N.D. IU.),
afl'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970); see Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L.J. 416, 427-32; cf. United States Steel Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 35 An. L.2D 790 (E.D. Va., Sept. 20, 1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 34 An. L.2D 1074 (E.D. Va., Apr. 4, 1974).
79. 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
80. FrC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667, 670-71 (S.D.N,Y. 1937).
$1. 154 F. Supp. at 913,
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financial data. 82 After studying the proposed method of publication, a
statistical expert has concluded that the aggregate data can be disaggregated to varying degrees by using sophisticated mathematical
pattern-recognition techniques, thereby revealing individual company
data. 3 To the extent that the aggregate LB reports can be disaggregated to reveal individual company data, then, measured by the principles elaborated in the foregoing discussion, it would seem that additional measures designed to protect individual company data from
disclosure are mandated before the program can go forward. In the
first place, if the trade secrets exception of the publication provision
is broad enough to encompass financial data of competitive significance, then the Commission simply lacks the authority to publish
the aggregate reports. But even if the trade secrets exception is not
82. See Memorandum of Legal Analysis in Opposition to the Federal Trade Commission's Annual Line-of-Business Program, by Edward T. Tait and Lee A. Ran, Reed,
Smith, Shaw & McClay, July 18, 1974, at 30-31.
83. See generally Memorandum on Disaggregation, supra note 21. In summarizing
these conclusions, the statistical expert stated that
it will be possible, using these LOB totals together with other company, market
and industry information, to disaggregate the published figures . . . . Mhe
publication of LOB data will enable some companies to find out more about
their competitors than those competitors will be able to find out about them.
Id. at 1.
He further concluded in a letter accompanying the memorandum:
1. Each company will be able to disaggregate to some extent the data for any
series of lines of business it selects, because in many situations it will be able
to compute exactly some elements of the [company]-by-[line-of-business] matrix, and in all situations it will be able to bracket the remaining elements
within lower and upper limits whose boundaries can be stated with precision.
In many of the latter cases, the range between the upper and lower boundaries
will be very narrow.
2. Different companies will, in general, be able to disaggregate the line-ofbusiness totals to different extents ....
3. Different companies will, in general, be subject to having their own totals
disaggregated by others to different extents ....
4. The disaggregation procedure enables each company to determine what additional information would help it to disaggregate even more precisely, and
therefore enables it to focus its data search on the most critical items. Letter
from Ronald Christensen, Entropy Limited, to Ira M. Millstein, Well, Gotshal
& Manges, Oct. 26, 1974.
This disaggregation procedure was reviewed by an independent expert who found that
Mr. Christensen has presented very convincing arguments that the publication
by [the] FTC of certain financial data by line-of-business totals can be used,
together with various company, market and industry data, to accurately determine in many situations the breakdown of FTC totals by company or at least
to determine exactly certain company contributions to the total and, with the
addition of such other ancillary information, it appears possible to estimate the
breakdown of many of the remaining company contributions to the line-ofbusiness totals within very narrow limits. Letter from George Dantzig, Professor, Stanford University, to Ira M. Millstein, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Oct. 26,
1974.
Disaggregation of figures reported in the QFR report has not been a problem since the
average number of firms in each reporting cell is 350 As compared with fifteen for the
LB report. Bureau Staff Report 25,
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broad enough to include business secrets of this type, it would seem
that the general limitations on the disclosure of confidential information should apply in this area.
The Commission itself has implicitly recognized the potential
harm involved in the disclosure of -this information by its adoption
of the LB confidentiality rules, which provide that "no individual
company data contained in the Line-of-Business Reports will be revealed in these [aggregate LB] reports . ... "84 In addition, the
General Counsel of the Commission has explicitly acknowledged -that
"there could be adverse long range consequences to competition from
such disclosure ...
85 The thrust of these statements is that individual company statistics should be protected from public disclosure;
thus, if disaggregation is a possibility, the logical conclusion is that
the FTC must redesign the program in order to avoid such public disclosure before any aggregate reports may be published.
CONCLUSION

As it is currently formulated, the LB program is obviously plagued
with many problems. The data that it will generate will contain some
inaccuracies, the costs to private industry in providing the FTC with
LB information will likely be high, and there is a possibility that
some confidential individual company statistics will be disclosed. Yet
the program also has the potential to furnish the government and
the public with significant product-line information on American industry-information not otherwise currently available. Moreover,
even from the point of view of industry, the LB program would seem
to have at least one very desirable aspect: it would provide companies with aggregate financial data on their competitors that could be
useful in promoting efficient resource allocation and maximum profits in their own operations.
Accordingly, rather than simply abandoning the LB program because of the current difficulties, it would seem that the best solution
would be to continue to refine ,the program through continuing discussion with representatives from the business community in order
to eliminate or at least reduce the problems inherent in the program
84. Rules and Procedures for the Use of Confidential Individual Company Data
Collected Under the FTC's Line of Business Report Program, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,970
(1974). In other situations, courts have held that agencies must comply with their own
rules and regulations. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959);
United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553, 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
85. Address by Calvin Collier, supra note 25, at 15.
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as it is presently designed. Meanwhile, although the FTC seems to
have the statutory authority to gather the information notwithstanding
the high cost to the companies complying with the LB orders,
the FTC should be restrained from publishing even aggregated statistics
until it can guarantee that individual company information will remain confidential.

